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This paper estimates the intergenerational income elasticity for urban China, paying careful 
attention to the potential biases induced by income fluctuations and life cycle effects. Our 
preferred estimates are that the intergenerational income elasticities are 0.74 for father-son, 
0.84 for father-daughter, 0.33 for mother-son, and 0.47 for mother-daughter. This suggests 
that while China has experienced rapid growth of absolute incomes, the relative position of 
children in the distribution is largely determined by their parents’ incomes. Investigating 
possible causal channels, we find that parental education, occupation, and Communist Party 
membership all play important roles in transmitting economic status from parents to children. 
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1. Introduction 
Economists have long been interested in the issue of intergenerational mobility. 
Estimating the relationship between the permanent incomes of parents and children is a 
critical component of a society’s income dynamics. A growing body of research has 
demonstrated large and systematic differences across nations, with parental income being 
a major determinant of children’s incomes in some countries, and much less important in 
others. To date, much of the existing research on intergenerational mobility has focused 
on developed nations.  While this has the advantage that data sources are generally more 
reliable, developed nations also tend to be politically stable and to have experienced 
modest rates of growth.  
By contrast, the growth experience of China over the past three decades has been 
nothing short of unprecedented. As the world’s most populous nation, Chinese living 
standards have risen six-fold since 1979. These rapid economic changes have also been 
accompanied by dramatic social transformations. All this makes China a unique case 
study through which to better understand the relationship between societal change and 
income mobility. 
In traditional Chinese society (prior to 1949), most social welfare was familial. 
There was a strong reciprocal relationship between parents and children. Parents 
normally invested a large proportion of their income and assets in  their offspring’s 
education and career development (and the parental social network played an important 
role in children’s access to education and the labour market). Children typically lived 
with their parents until marriage (and in many cases, after marriage as well). In return, 
parents expected their children to support them in old age.  
During the Maoist era (1949-77), social welfare was universally provided in urban 
areas, with the aim of making Chinese society more egalitarian. By and large, this 
successfully compressed the distribution of income and wealth over the Maoist period 
(Meng 2004, 2007; Benjamin, Brandt, Giles and Wang, 2005). In addition,  the early 
socialist revolution attempted to weaken the social ties between parental and children’s 
1occupations by making it impossible for children to inherit any meaningful wealth from 
their parents, and opening up better opportunities for education and occupational 
attainment for the children of poor families (Cheng and Dai 1995). These might have 
facilitated an increase in intergenerational income mobility.  
However, close family ties still exist and continue to deliver economic and social 
advantages from one generation to another. Indeed, some government policies have even 
decreased mobility. For instance, the policies of intergenerational job replacement (Dingti) 
and internal recruitment (Neizhao), which were introduced in 1977 and then were to be 
abolished in 1986, might have reduced the level of mobility in urban China (Yu and Liu, 
2004).
4 In addition, the unique household registration system initiated in Mao’s era 
restricted geographic labor mobility, and therefore probably reduced intergenerational 
mobility (Wu and Treiman, 2003).
5  
The transition from a planned to a market oriented economy initiated in the late 
1970s and early 1980s has moved the society away from the social provision of welfare 
back towards one that relies heavily upon individual and family responsibilities (Cai, 
Giles and Meng, 2006). As a consequence, income/wealth inequality has increased 
sharply and family networks play an important role in job attainment, which, in turn, may 
have resulted in falling  inter-generational income mobility. In the meantime, a steady 
increase in geographic mobility may have boosted intergenerational mobility across 
China as a whole (Wu and Treiman, 2003; Yu and Liu, 2004; Takenoshita, 2007).
6 
                                                            
4 Yu and Liu (2004) find that since 1978, the sector, rank and size of parents’ work unit have had 
significant effects on that their children’s first job, and this effect did not attenuate even after 1986 when 
these two policies were abolished.  
5 In Mao’s era, China’s unique household registration system restricted people in rural areas or small cities 
from accessing better opportunities in urban areas or large cities. They could only move permanently across 
regions by applying for permission, achieving tertiary education, getting military experience, or being 
recruited into a state-owned enterprise. Under the household registration system, most parents and children 
would locate in a same city. The intergenerational persistence in locality enhanced the intergenerational 
persistence in education and labor market outcomes due to systematic regional disparities in educational 
quality and labor markets. 
6 Since China’s post-1978 economic reforms, the household registration system was gradually relaxed, with 
permission no longer required for temporary moves across regions, and local registration no longer needed 
in order to acquire an informal job or to run an individual business. However, to access the jobs in the 
formal sector, or to permanently change their registration, people still require tertiary education, military 
experience or sufficient capital.  
2A few studies on intergenerational mobility in China appear mainly in the 
sociological literature. These generally focus on social stratification and political 
affiliation. Such studies mainly concentrate on occupational mobility and find strong 
intergenerational transmission in occupations and industries (Lin and Bian, 1991; Cheng 
and Dai 1995; Takenoshita, 2007). In general, Communist Party members and state 
employees (especially government officials) have many social advantages in obtaining 
entrance into university, or locating better job opportunities for their children (Lin and 
Bian, 1991; Walder, Li and Treiman, 2000; Bian, 2002; Meng, 2007).  
The only other study on intergenerational income mobility in urban China is Guo 
and Min (2008), who uses the Chinese Urban Household Education and Employment 
Survey 2004 (UHEES 2004). They estimate the overall intergenerational income 
elasticity in urban China to be 0.32 (for fathers and sons) and find that education has 
played an important role in promoting intergenerational income mobility. However, their 
study uses only one income observation for parents, and one income observation for 
children. We aim to advance on this work by accounting for life cycle variation of 
income, and exploring the possible role of parental social status in determining children’s 
outcomes. 
This paper combines UHEES 2004 with repeated cross-sectional datasets 
covering nearly 20 years. To preview our results, we find a much higher intergenerational 
income elasticity than the previous estimates by Guo and Min (2008). After accounting for 
fluctuations in parents’ incomes and life cycle variation in children’s incomes, we 
estimate that the intergenerational elasticity in urban China is around 0.74 for father-son, 
0.84 for father-daughter, 0.33 for mother-son, and 0.47 for mother-daughter. This is an 
extremely high level of intergenerational persistence, and implies that intergenerational 
mobility is much lower in China than in most developed nations. Exploring the channels 
through which income is transmitted across generations, we conclude that parental education, 
occupation, industry, and Communist Party membership all play important roles in 
transmitting economic status from parents to children. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reports the methodology on how to 
estimate intergenerational income elasticity. Section 3 describes the data and summarizes 
3the statistics. Section 4 presents estimates of intergenerational income and earnings 
elasticities. Section 5 explores the main channels through which income is transmitted 
from parents to children. The final section concludes. 
2. Methodology 
Studies of intergenerational mobility generally estimate the association between 
the socioeconomic status of parents and their offspring. Becker and Tomes (1979) first 
suggested a log-linear intergenerational income regression to estimate the 
intergenerational elasticity. 
i pi ci y y ε β α + + = ,   (1) 
where  ci y is the log of children’s income,  pi y is the log of parents’ income. The 
coefficient β is the intergenerational income elasticity. The larger the elasticity, the less 
mobility in a given society.  
Ideally, intergenerational mobility calculations should estimate the elasticity of 
lifetime income between children and parents.
7 Using just one year’s earnings/income 
data for parents and children can lead to a significant underestimate of the true lifetime 
intergenerational elasticity (Solon, 1992;  Mazumder, 2005; Haider and Solon, 2006; 
Bohlmark and Lindquist, 2006; Dunn, 2007).
8  
In order to deal with the measurement error from using one year earnings/income 
to proxy for lifetime earnings/income, previous studies take an average of income over a 
number of different years for parents in order to obtain a better estimate of permanent 
income (Solon, 1992; Lee and Solon, 2006; Nicoletti and Ermisch, 2007). However, 
Mazumder (2005) argues that the transitory component of income is highly persistent and 
even a five year average may still provide a rather poor measurement of permanent 
income.  
                                                            
7 In theory, one might argue that what should be important is not a parent’s lifetime income, but the amount 
of resources available in the household during the years when the child was growing up. In practice, most 
researchers have typically regarded this issue as being less important than obtaining a stable measure of 
parental income or earnings. 
8 For instance, Dunn (2007) finds that in Brazil, the intergenerational earnings elasticity grows sharply with 
son’s age, reaching a maximum for sons aged 49, before falling slightly as son’s age increases further. 
Father’s age is found to have much less effect on mobility estimates than the son’s age and the use of 
father’s age over 40 produces quite stable elasticity estimates. 
4Although measurement error in the dependent variable does not in itself lead to 
attenuation bias, Haider and Solon (2006) point out that a attenuation bias can be caused 
by using log current earnings when children are in their twenties (a point at which current 
earnings may be quite different from average lifetime earnings). This error can be 
minimized by using log current earnings measured when children are aged in their thirties 
or forties (a point at which current earnings are close to average lifetime earnings). 
To address these issues, prior researchers have controlled for the age of both 
children and parents, averaging parental income over multiple years, or predicting 
parental lifetime income by instrumenting income using parental characteristics (Reville, 
1995; Dearden, Machin and Reed, 1997; Bjoklund and Jantti, 1997; Fortin and Lefebvre, 
1998; Grawe, 2001; Chadwick and Solon , 2002; Mazumder, 2005; Lefranc and Trannoy, 
2005; Haider and Solon, 2006; Grawe, 2006; Ferreira and Veloso, 2006; Lee and Solon, 
2006, Nicoletti and Ermisch, 2007; Herz et al., 2007; Mocetti, 2007; Dunn, 2007; Leigh, 
2007). However, a key issue in the instrumental variable approach is selecting 
instruments that only affect children’s earnings through the channel of parental earnings, 
and do not directly impact children’s earnings (Solon, 1992).   
In addition to general issues that arise when estimating intergenerational 
elasticities, the specific economic environment in China over recent decades may also 
pose additional difficulty in estimating parental lifetime income. Due to rapid economic 
growth and sectoral change, the age-earnings profile and the return to particular 
demographic characteristics have shifted markedly. Figure 1 presents the changes in age-
earnings profiles over the period 1988-2007.  Figure 1a depicts the log of average real 
annual earnings for each particular birth cohort as they age. The different lines are for 
different birth cohorts, starting withthose born between 1970-75 (aged 20-25 in 1995) 
and ending with people born between 1935-39 (aged 56-60 in 1995). This figure may be 
read in two ways. Comparing different birth cohorts at a given age it shows earnings 
growth across cohorts holding age constant. We find that at the same age, the real 
earnings for different cohorts changed dramatically. For example, at age of 40 those who 
were born in 1960-64 earned about 50 percent more than those born in 1950-54 earned 
when they were the same age. We can also follow the trajectory of a single line and it 
shows age-earnings profile for different birth cohorts. If the age-earnings profile in China 
5had remained constant, one would expect to see the the shape of the lines remaining 
parallel to one another. Instead, it is evident that earnings growth has affected the wage 
profile differentially for different cohorts. For example, for those born in 1950-54 the 
profile did not flatten out untilage 50, whereas for those born between 1960-64, the 
profile started to flatten out when they turned 38. 
Another way to illustrate the same point is to look at age-earnings profiles over 
time. Figure 1b takes the average real earnings ratios for each age between 1988 and 
1995, 1995 and 2000,  and 2000 and 2007. If there is no change in the shape of the age-
earnings profile, the graph should show horizontal lines. Figure 1b indicates that between 
1988 and 1995, real earnings rose for workers in their 30s, but fell for workers in their 
60s. This was partly reversed between 1995 and 2000 (when workers in their 50s and 60s 
enjoyed the most rapid earnings growth). In the period 2000−2007, prime-aged workers 
again experienced more rapid growth in real earnings than their older and younger 
counterparts).  
Figure 2 presents the partial and marginal R
2s of age, education, provincial 
dummy variables, industry and occupation in the earnings equations over the same period. 
The changes in the importance of age and provincial dummy variables in explaining 
earnings variation overtime is striking. At the beginning of the period, around one-quarter 
of the variation in earnings could be explained by age and its squared term alone, while at 
the end of the period a quadratic in age explained just 2 per cent. Similarly, the impact of 
provincial dummy variables doubled from about 10 percent to 20 percent between the 
late 1980s to the mid 1990s, before declining to its original level in the 2000s. Education, 
on the other hand, explained less than 3 per cent of the variation in earnings at the 
beginning of the period, but over 10 per cent at the end of the period. 
Given the significant changes in the shape of the age-earnings profiles as well as 
the changing returns to demographics, it is even more problematic to assume that a single 
year of income can be used to proxy parents’ permanent income in urban China.   
In our empirical analysis, we modify equation (1) by controlling for a quadratic in 
children’s age and a quadratic in parental age, and including indicator variables for the 16 
regions that comprise our sample (see footnote 12): 
6i ci
2
pi 2 pi 1
2
ci 2 ci 1 pi ci R A A A A y y ε δ γ γ ϕ ϕ β α + + + + + + + = , (2) 
where  ci y is the log of the child’s observed income,  pi y is the log of the parent’s observed 
income,  ci A is the child’s age minus 40 (and 
2
ci A  is its square),  pi A is the parent’s age (and 
2
pi A is its square).  ci R  is a vector of regional dummy variables capturing regional variation 
in prices and wages.  
  In our first specification, we use OLS to estimate equation (2), and restrict the age 
range for children and parents to an interval where current earnings are the best proxy for 
long-run earnings (we also experiment with varying this age range).
9  
Our second specification aims to address the potential downward bias caused by 
mis-measurement of parental income by instrumenting reported parental income with 
parental education.
10 This method, however, may suffer from certain weaknesses. If the 
rate of return to human capital changes significantly over time, as has occurred in China 
(Meng and Kidd, 1997; Zhang, Zhao, Park, and Song, 2005; and Meng, Shen, and Xue, 
2009), we will mis-estimate different cohorts’ lifetime income. Another problem is 
parental education may have an independent effect on children’s income (Solon, 1992). 
For example, nepotism in the Chinese university admissions process might lead us to 
overestimate the true intergenerational income elasticity if we instrument using parental 
education. Similarly, nepotism in the Chinese job market might lead us to overestimate 
the true intergenerational income elasticity if we instrument using parental occupation.  
Our third approach, following Arellano and Meghir (1992), Angrist and Krueger 
(1992), Bjorklund and Jantti (1997), Mocetti (2007), and Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007) is 
to adopt the method of two-sample two-stage-least-squares (TS2SLS). To implement this, 
we use the cross sectional survey (UHEES 2004) containing information on both 
children’s and parents’ current income, education, and demographics. We then combine 
this with repeated cross-sectional data covering a two-decade period, and include 
information about parental pseudo-cohorts’ earnings, education, occupation, and actual 
                                                            
9 Although we are guided in this analysis by the work of Haider and Solon (2006), their empirical analysis 
uses U.S. data, and therefore considers an economy with a relatively stable wage growth and age-earnings 
profile. The situation for China is different. As indicated in Figure 1a, over time the age-earnings profile 
has changed markedly, with 30-45 year olds experiencing more rapid wage increases than other age groups. 
10 To test sensitivity of the instrument we also use parental occupation and industry of employment as 
instruments to predict their permanent income. 
7labour market experience. We predict parental permanent income using the latter data 
source, hoping that it will allow us to better proxy parental permanent income over a 
period of significant income changes.  
To be precise, we use the repeated cross-section sample to estimate the following 
equation separately for each gender and year over the period 1986-2004: 
it it it it v ov Pr X y + + + = η β α   (3) 
where  it y is the log of observed real income (deflated by province-specific price indices) 
for individuals who are of working age (men aged 16 to 60 and women aged 16 to 55) 
and working in year t,  Xiis a vector of individual characteristics including years of 
schooling, actual age and its square term in year t, while  it ov Pr is a vector of provincial 
dummies. Since the second stage equation also includes parental age and a vector of 
provincial dummies, the excluded instrument is parental education. We also repeat the 
same exercise using occupation and industry of employment as the instruments. 
Based on the estimated coefficients from Equation (3) and parental demographics 
from the survey that contains information on parents and children, we then predict 
parental income year by year for the period 1986-2004.
11 After doing so, we calculate 
each individual’s average earnings taking away the time trend. Only the sample of 
individuals who have at least 5 consecutive years of predicted parental income are 
included.  
In addition to the benefit of better capturing parental permanent income, this 
method also significantly increases the number of observations with both children and 
parental incomes. However, this method does not avoid the problem of violating the 
exclusion restriction. Hence, when interpreting the results we should bear this in mind.  
                                                            
11 The age of the parents for the year t-n for the prediction is calculated by ( n A A t n t − = − ). Because we 
have information from the parent-child dataset (UHEES 2004) on the exact year in which parents started 
work and retired, we are able to predict parental income in each of the 19 years for those who were working 
at the time. For parents who started the first job or retired during the 1986-2004 period, their predicted 
income is set to missing for the period before they started working or after they retired. 
83. Data and Summary Statistics  
The data used for this study are from two sources: the Urban Household 
Education and Employment Survey 2004 (UHEES) and the Urban Household Income 
and Expenditure Survey 1986-2004 (UHIES). The first survey was conducted jointly by 
the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and Beijing University while the second was 
conducted by NBS.
12  
The 2004 UHEES collected detailed information on demographic characteristics, 
educational attainment, labour market status, labour market history, party membership, 
annual income, and annual earnings in 2004 for all household members residing in the 
household as well as non-residing parents of the household head and his or her spouse.
13 
The fact that the UHEES also surveys non-resident parents makes it particularly well-
suited to our empirical analysis. For parents who are retired or deceased, the survey 
records their last occupation and industry. The 2004 UHEES covers 9,994 urban 
households and 67,132 individuals. The UHIES is a repeated cross-section data for the 
years 1986-2004, which we use to predict parental permanent income. It includes 
information on household income, as well as individuals’ age, gender, education, 
occupation and industry.
14   
The survey data can be reorganized into child-parent pairs, where each pair 
includes individual information for children and parents. There are two different kinds of 
children in the sample. Some are children residing in their parents’ home where a parent 
is the household head (we call these the ‘parent-headed sample’). Another group are 
children residing in their own home (we call these the ‘child-headed sample’).  
These samples are found to have a different age distribution, with both children 
and parents being much younger in the parent-headed sample than in the child-headed 
                                                            
12 The UHIES is a nationwide survey (31 provinces) but due to confidentiality restrictions, we have access 
to data for only 16 provinces. There are 12 provinces included in the UHEES survey (Beijing, Shanxi, 
Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hubei, Guangdong, Sichuan, Guizhou, Shaanxi, and Gansu).  
When using UHIES to estimate earnings equations as a base for predicted parental earnings, we use data 
for all 16 provinces we have access to (not just the 12 in the UHEES). 
13 However, non-residing children of the household head and spouse are not surveyed. 
14 For detailed description of the UHIES data, see Meng, Gong, and Wang, 2009. 
9sample (see Figure 3). We hope that combining the two samples will give us a sample of 
parents and children who are reasonably representative of the general population.  
The UHEES data includes 28,729 child-parent pairs. Excluding pairs with 
children younger than 16 or currently at school, those with an intergenerational age 
difference below 14 years, there are 18,596 child-parent pairs. We further restrict our 
sample to those who are working and  who have a positive income in 2004 with a father 
or mother who is no older than 74 and 69 in 2004, respectively.
15 With these further 
restrictions and excluding missing values and very few outliers 5475  child-father and 
3431 child-mother pairs remain in the sample.
16  For some of our specifications, we 
restrict the sample to those  where both the parent and child are within the working-age 
range and are currently (in 2004) working, and with non-missing income data. This 
further reduces the sample size to 1813.
17 
The summary statistics of children’s and parents’ ages, years of education, income, 
and earnings are reported in Table 1.
18 The top panel reports all child-parent pairs in our 
UHEES sample, while the lower panel reports the sample in which both children and 
parents are working in 2004. Below we only discuss in detail the bottom panel results. 
Children are between 17 and 41 years old, fathers between 39 and 60 and mothers 
between 37 and 55. The average age is about 26 for children, 54 for fathers and 50 for 
mothers. Slightly more than half of the sample children are males. The average number of 
years of schooling is about 13.5 for children and 10 for parents. The table also shows that 
(conditional on working) fathers have the highest income and earnings on average, 
followed by children and then mothers.  
                                                            
15 This is because when using UHIES data to predict for parental earnings, we restrict for each year that 
father's and mother's age should be no older than 60 and 55, respectively, they should have at least 5 years 
of predicted earnings to be included in the sample. The earliest data we have for UHIES is 1986 and to 
have at least 5 years of predicted earnings the parents have to be no older than 60 or 55 in 1990 (no older 
than 74 and 69 in 2004). 
16 This is the sample used in Table 3A. Summing across the four combinations (father-son, father-daughter, 
mother-son, mother-daughter), the sample size is 2813+2662+1734+1697=8906. 
17 This is the sample used in Table 2. Summing across the four combinations (father-son, father-daughter 
mother-son, , mother-daughter), the sample size is 646+313+592+262=1813. 
18 The incomes in this study are in 2004 prices, based on provincial urban CPI indices.  
 
104. Estimated Intergenerational Income Elasticity 
The intergenerational income elasticity is estimated using Equation (2) for father-
son, father-daughter, mother-son and mother-daughter and for the different age groups of 
children separately. We use the three different methods discussed in Section 2. The 
results from the first method (OLS using just the 2004 UHEES) are presented in the top 
panel of Table 2. Controlling for child and parent age and their square terms, we estimate 
a father-son income elasticity of 0.24. Restricting children’s age to above 23 and further 
to above 30, the elasticities increase to 0.25 and 0.32, respectively. A similar pattern is 
found for father-daughter, mother-son, and mother-daughter elasticities. However, when 
we restrict the sample to children aged 30 and above, we have relatively few observations 
with which to estimate mother-son and mother-daughter elasticities and the resulting 
income elasticities are not precisely estimated. In general, the parent-son elasticities are 
higher than the parent-daughter elasticities. For the sample of all children, the R-squared 
statistics range between 0.25 and 0.35, suggesting that parental income and the other 
demographic controls in our regression can explain up to one-third of the variation in 
children’s incomes. (Note that we do not report the R-squared in subsequent 
specifications, since it is not a particularly meaningful statistic in instrumental variable 
regressions.) 
The bottom panel of Table 2 presents the results using one cross-sectional survey 
(the 2004 UHEES), but instrumenting income using parental demographics. The 
estimated elasticities increase somewhat, but the general pattern does not change much. 
Again, given that the sample size in the mother-son and mother-daughter samples is 
extremely small, so we do not place much weight on these estimated intergenerational 
elasticities.  
We then move to use predicted parental income from the UHIES data to estimate 
Equation (2). Before we do so, we report some basic statistics of the predictions of the 
parental permanent income and examine briefly the relationship between predicted 
parental permanent income and their observed income in 2004 for a sample of parents 
who are working in 2004 and have reported a positive income.  
11On average fathers’ permanent incomes are predicted using 13 years of data, 
while mothers’ permanent incomes are predicted using 12 years of past income data. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the number of years’ income used in this analysis. 
Only 5 per cent of the sample have 5 or fewer years of data, while many have 10 years or 
more. These data should give us a fairly good measure of the permanent income. As 
indicated in Mazumder (2005) more years of data eliminates the downward bias due to 
persistent transitory shocks and corrects for the age-related errors-in-variables bias. In 
addition, as discussed in Section 2 there have been significant changes in the earnings 
levels and earnings determination mechanism. Using average predicted earnings from 
repeated cross-sectional data for the past 20 years will help us account for the non-linear 
impact of these changes in earnings, thereby helping to reduce errors-in-variables bias. 
We then examine the relationship between parental predicted permanent incomes 
and their reported income in 2004 for a group of parents who were working in 2004 and 
had positive income. Figure 5 shows a strong positive relationship between current and 
predicted permanent income (the correlation coefficient is 0.46 for fathers and 0.55 for 
mothers). In Figure 6, we plot the difference between the current income and predicted 
permanent income for both mothers and fathers and find only a modest difference 
between their current and permanent incomes. For both fathers and mothers, the standard 
deviation of the difference is about 0.6, suggesting that for two-thirds of respondents, the 
difference between their permanent and current incomes is less than 60 log points (about 
80 percent). This is a larger gap than one would expect to observe in a developed nation, 
but as we have noted, the rapid changes in the Chinese labor market over recent decades 
have had quite differential impacts across the working-age population. 
Having examined the reliability of the predicted permanent income data for 
parents, we use these data to estimate Equation (2) and report the results in Table 3. 
Columns 1 to 4 in panels A and B of Table 3 show father-child and mother-child 
intergenerational income elasticities for different age groups of children, while column 5 
restricts the sample to individuals whose fathers were working in 2004. Thus, the 
permanent income elasticities reported in column 5 are essentially comparable to the 
12current income elasticities reported in columns 1 and 4 of Table 2 (which use current year 
reported incomes for both children and parents).
19   
The father-son income elasticities estimated using predicted permanent fathers’ 
incomes are more than double those estimated using current year reported income. For 
example, for the group of sons aged 30-42 in 2004 the estimated intergenerational income 
elasticity is 0.32 using reported father’s income for 2004 (Table 2, Panel A, column 3, 
first row). Instrumenting father’s income, the elasticity is 0.23 (Table 2, Panel B, column 
3). However, if we use fathers’ permanent income – instrumented with education – the 
intergenerational elasticity rises to 0.74 (Table 3, Panel A, column 4).
20 A similar pattern 
is found if the sample is restricted to cases in which the father worked in 2004. In this 
sample, the elasticity using reported father income in 2004 is 0.24 (column 1 of Table 2), 
while using father’s predicted permanent income the elasticity increases to 0.45 (column 
5 in  Panel A of Table 3).  
For father-daughter pairs, the increase in elasticity when using fathers’ permanent 
income relative to using fathers’ reported income is almost the same as for the father-son 
pairs. For mother-son and mother-daughter pairs, the increase in estimated elasticities 
from using mothers' permanent income is not as large as for father-son and father-
daughter pairs, but the general pattern is consistent. 
Our preferred specification restricts the sample to children aged 30-42 (to account 
for lifecycle bias), and uses parental predicted permanent income. The estimated 
elasticities in this specification are 0.74 for father-son, 0.84 for father-daughter, 0.33 for 
mother-son, and 0.47 for mother-daughter. 
The above results use predicted parental permanent income with education as the 
instrument. We also estimated the same regressions using predicted parental permanent 
income with occupation and industry as the instruments. The results are presented in 
                                                            
19 The sample sizes in columns 1 and 4 of Table 2 are slightly smaller than those shown in column 5 of 
Table 3A, since there are a handful of parents who are working but for whom we do not observe incomes. 
Dropping these cases makes no substantive difference to the comparison – the elasticity is much higher 
when we use permanent parental incomes (Table 3A) than when we use one-year parental incomes (Table 
2).  
20 In practice, the age range of the sample that uses current father’s income (Table 2, column 3, third row) 
is 30-39. However, if we place the same age restriction on the sample that uses permanent father’s income 
(Table 3A, column 4), we obtain results very similar to those reported in Table 3A . 
13Appendix A.  Using occupation and industry as instruments the estimated 
intergenerational elasticities are lower than using education (but still much higher than 
those using current parental income). In attempting to see what explains the difference, 
we found that the unconditional correlation between child income and parental income is 
very similar using either instrument set (see Appendix B for the comparison of the 
unconditional relationships). Only when we introduce regional dummy variables into the 
regression do the estimates diverge. Our conjecture is that perhaps within a particular 
region there is more income variation across education levels than across 
occupation/industry groups. Thus, within a particular region the predicted income using 
education has more variation than predicted income using occupation and industry.   
We also estimated the elasticity of children’s incomes with respect to their 
parents’ combined incomes. The results are presented in Panel C of Table 3. In this 
specification, the sample is restricted to children whose father works (and thus the sample 
size is the same as for the father estimates in Table 3A). Note that in the case of two-
earner households, combined parental income is the sum of both parents’ incomes and in 
the case of one-earner households, just the father’s income. The parent-son elasticity is 
0.55 for sons at all ages, and increases slightly to 0.59 when we restrict the sample to 
sons aged 30-42. This estimate lies below the corresponding father-son elasticities and 
above mother-son elasticities estimates reported in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. 
Our estimated parent-son elasticities are closer to the father-son estimates than to the 
mother-son estimates. This is simply an indication that by definition fathers’ incomes 
dominate the measure of combined parental income.  
Our findings are quite consistent with the literature, which shows that the longer 
the period used to generate parental permanent income, the lower is the attenuation bias 
and the larger the estimated intergenerational income elasticity. For example, Mazumder 
(2005) finds that using two year average data for the US the estimated IGE is 0.25 for 
father-son pairs. It rises to 0.61 when using 16 years’ of father’s earnings, an increase of 
144 per cent. Mazumder (2005) attributes the higher estimate to reducing the downward 
bias that stems from transitory shocks and correcting for age-related errors-in-variables 
bias. 
14Cross-country comparison of intergenerational income mobility is hampered by 
the fact that different studies use a variety of empirical methods, and observe children at 
different ages. The intergenerational income elasticity for father-son is the most 
commonly estimated in the literature. Table 7 compares our results with some recent 
estimates of intergenerational elasticities (most are for fathers and sons, but some are 
estimated for other family combinations).  
Comparing our TS2SLS results for son aged 30 to 42 with the studies that use 
similar methods and restrict children to those aged in their thirties and forties, we find 
that our estimated father-son intergenerational income elasticity in urban China (0.74) is 
at the upper end of the range of estimates for other countries. For example, the estimated 
elasticity is 0.22 for Canada (Fortin and Lefebvre, 1998), about 0.25 for Australia (Leigh, 
2007), 0.28 for Sweden (Bjorklund and Jantti, 1997), 0.41 for France (leFranc and 
Trannoy, 2005), 0.44 for Italy (Mocetti, 2007), and 0.4−0.6 for the United States (Solon, 
1992; Mazumder, 2005).
21  
5. How Is Income Earning Ability Transmitted Across 
Generations? 
In this section, we analyze how income earning ability is transferred across 
generations in urban China, focusing particularly on the role of education, party 
membership, occupation and industry.   
Education is believed to be a significant pathway of intergenerational 
transmission for many countries.
22   Using our full sample, we therefore estimate 
intergenerational educational transmission by both schooling years and by categories of 
educational attainment: (1) lower secondary schooling or less; (2) upper secondary 
schooling; (3) college and above.  
                                                            
21 There are too few studies of father-daughter, mother-son, and mother-daughter elasticities to draw strong 
conclusions about how our results compare with those for other countries. However, given that these 
elasticities tend to be highly correlated within countries, it seems reasonable to conclude that urban China is 
relatively socially immobile for women as well as men. 
22 For instance, when education is not subsidized, rich parents can invest more in their children’s education 
than poor parents. Subsidized education can be a way of equalizing opportunities for poor children (Eide 
and Showalter, 1999; Ng, 2007).  
15Table 4 cross tabulates the education level of parents and children. In the total 
sample, 28 percent of sons have lower secondary schooling or less, 34 percent have upper 
secondary schooling, and 38 percent have a college degree. Depending on which 
combination we look at (father-son, father-daughter, mother-son, or mother-daughter), 
between 44 and 49 percent of children are in the same education category as their parents. 
Measured in years of schooling rather than categorically, the correlation coefficient 
between parents’ and children’s education ranges from 0.22 for mothers and sons to 0.38 
for mothers and daughters (see the bottom panel of Table 4). Among fathers who have a 
college degree, 62 percent of their sons have a college degree. Among mothers with a 
college degree, 65 percent of their sons have a college degree. A similar pattern can be 
observed for daughters. 
Figure 7 presents the estimated relationship between parents' and children's 
schooling years by children’s birth year and gender, with the sample restricted to children 
aged 25 years or older (since respondents aged less than 25 are more likely to be in the 
process of completing their education). The chart shows that the intergenerational 
association of schooling is approximately three times higher for children born in the late-
1970s than for children born in the early-1950s. This increase can be explained partly by 
the end of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1976, followed by the restoration of the 
University Entrance Examinations in 1977. For children born after 1960, this increased 
the gap in educational attainment between those with higher-educated parents and those 
with less-educated parents (Meng and Gregory, 2002). 
By international standards, the intergenerational education correlation in urban 
China is relatively low (compare our results with Hertz et al., 2007), although it has 
increased significantly over the past half-century. The main factor in this is the high 
persistence of college attainment across generations.  
Parents’ social networks can play an important role in providing their children 
with access to better opportunities in both education and the labor market (Lin and Bian, 
1991; Walder, Li and Treiman, 2000; Meng, 2007). Communist Party membership can be 
transferred across generations through parental role models and social networks. The 
intergenerational transmission of occupations and industries is more complicated. It 
16depends on whether the parental social network plays an important role in children’s 
entrance to the labor market and their promotion in the workplace; whether there are 
entry barriers due to crafts, professional and technical skills that are handed down; 
whether the attitudes and norms of family ties differ between rich and poor parents; and 
whether cohabitation with parents strengthens intergenerational persistence through the 
effects on beliefs and preferences (Mocetti, 2007).  
Table 5 reports the persistence matrices of Communist Party membership, 
occupation, and sector of employment between children and parents by gender using the 
total sample. The first panel of Table 5 shows that if the parents are party members, their 
children are between 4 and 10 percentage points more likely to be party members (for 
sons, this represents about a 10-20 percent increase in the probability of joining the party, 
while for daughters it represents a more than 50 percent increase in the probability of 
party membership). The second panel indicates a very strong persistence in occupation 
between children and parents. If fathers or mothers are working in the occupation 
“professionals and technicians”, their children are 35-40 percentage points more likely to 
also be working in this occupation than those whose parents are not (this represents a 
near-tripling in the probability of being in this occupational category). The differences for 
“administration staff” are 17-23 percentage points (approximately a doubling in the 
probability), while for “production and transportation workers” the differences are 16-30 
percentage points (having a father who was a production worker approximately triples the 
probability that a child will enter this occupational grouping, while having a mother who 
was a production worker doubles the probability). 
The third panel of Table 5 presents the proportions of sons and daughters working 
in the state-owned sector based on whether their fathers and mothers also work in that 
sector. Seventy-one percent of sons and 67 percent of daughters work in the state-owned 
sector. Children are 6-9 percentage points (about 10 percent) more likely to work in the 
state-owned sector if one of their parents also worked in that sector.  
17 6. Conclusions  
An old Chinese saying holds that families will “be poor no more than three 
generations and be rich no more than three generations”.
23 This suggests that in China, as 
in many nations, there is a strong popular belief in social mobility. Our findings challenge 
this view. At least for modern-day urban China, we find a strikingly low level of 
intergenerational mobility. Our preferred estimates show that the intergenerational 
income elasticities are 0.74 for father-son, 0.84 for father-daughter, 0.33 for mother-son, 
and 0.47 for mother-daughter. Internationally, our estimated father-son elasticity places 
urban China among the least socially mobile places in the world.  
Empirically, our analysis shows the importance of obtaining a measure of 
permanent income, and accounting for lifecycle bias. If we use single-year income 
measures for parents, we obtain substantially lower estimates of the intergenerational 
income elasticity for China (indeed, such estimates imply that urban China is an 
extremely socially mobile place). However, when we use predicted permanent incomes, 
and restrict the sample of children to those aged 30-42 (to account for lifecycle bias), we 
obtain intergenerational elasticities that are sometimes twice as large.  
Note that we do not formally calculate intergenerational correlations for urban 
China, since doing so would require information on the underlying variance in permanent 
incomes (recall that we predict parental income using parental demographics). However, 
given that income inequality in urban China (measured by annual incomes) has risen 
markedly over recent decades, it is likely that inequality of permanent incomes has also 
risen. The intergenerational correlation (ρ) is simply equal to the elasticity (β), multiplied 
by the ratio of the standard deviation of log income in the parents’ generation (σp) and the 





β ρ = . Since permanent income is likely more 
dispersed in the 2000s than in the 1980s, it is probable that the intergenerational income 
correlation in urban China would be lower than the intergenerational income elasticity.
24 
                                                            
23 “Qiong bu guo san dai, fu bu guo san dai”. 
24 For example, the coefficient variation of annual real earnings rose from 0.45 in 1988 to 0.81 in 2004. 
18However, even taking this into account, China’s intergenerational correlation is likely to 
be higher than that observed for most developed nations.  
Another factor to bear in mind is that our study focuses only on urban China. 
Given the large income differences between rural and urban China, it is likely that 
intergenerational mobility is higher for individuals born in rural parts of the country, and 
therefore that the intergenerational elasticity of income (or earnings) for the entire 
country is likely to be lower than that which we estimate for urban China. However, from 
a policy perspective, our estimated elasticity is still an important parameter. Although 
rural-urban migration offers the potential for upwards social mobility for those born in 
rural areas, it only offers the potential for downwards social mobility for those born in 
urban areas.  
Exploring possible pathways, we find that education, especially college study, is 
one channel through which earnings ability is transmitted from parents to children 
(though the intergenerational association of education is still lower in urban China than in 
many other nations). We also find intergenerational correlations for parental party 
membership, occupation, and industry. The occupational correlation is particularly high, 
suggesting that occupation may be the most important channel through which 
intergenerational transmission occurs in urban China. However, it is also possible that 
factors we do not perfectly observe in our data – such as genes, health, or social networks 
– are also significant explanators of intergenerational transmission in urban China.  
19 
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Total Sample Individuals Age range Age range
Children 17‐56 17‐53
Parents 38‐73 37‐68
Age Children 34.16 7.14 31.75 6.76
Parents 62.3 7.02 57.34 6.28
Males Children 0.51 0.50
Years of schooling Children 13.15 2.31 13.46 2.18
Parents 10.06 2.31 9.88 3.64
Annual income Children 15455 12782 15613 12930
Predicted average annual income between 
1986 and 2004 Parents 7628 2295 6000 2199
Predicted combined parental annual income 






Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age
Children 26.51 3.91 24.94 3.25
Parents 53.76 3.79 49.98 3.38
Males Children 0.52 0.54
Years of schooling
Children 13.4 2.56 13.37 2.53
Parents 10.24 2.96 9.98 2.73
Annual income
Children 14067 13155 13441 13643
Parents 17642 13513 13849 10801
Annual earnings
Children 13634 12593 13173 13235
Parents 16903 12235 13372 10687
No. of pairs pairs 1238 507
25Table 2: Intergenerational Income Elasticities Using Current Incomes
Panel A: OLS Sons Daughters
Father All children Children aged >= 23 Children aged >= 30 All children Children aged >= 23 Children aged >= 30
Log(father's income) 0.241*** 0.245*** 0.321*** 0.215*** 0.183*** 0.318***
[0.0330] [0.0326] [0.102] [0.0458] [0.0456] [0.100]
Observations 646 572 127 592 515 137
R‐squared 0.301 0.265 0.444 0.254 0.231 0.426
Children's age range 17‐39 23‐39 30‐39 17‐41 23‐41 30‐42
Father's age range 39‐60 40‐60 50‐60 42‐60 43‐60 52‐60
Mother
Log(mother's income) 0.302*** 0.356*** 0.342 0.174** 0.185*** 0.490
[0.0840] [0.0631] [0.333] [0.0689] [0.0662] [0.524]
Observations 313 254 34 262 212 24
R‐squared 0.348 0.349 0.686 0.303 0.294 0.611
Children's age range 17‐39 23‐39 30‐39 17‐43 23‐38 30‐38
Mother's age range 37‐55 41‐55 51‐55 40‐55 42‐55 48‐55
Panel B: IV Sons Daughters
Father All children Children aged >= 23 Children aged >= 30 All children Children aged >= 23 Children aged >= 30
Log(father's income) [IV=educ.] 0.346*** 0.352*** 0.231 0.301*** 0.190 0.084
[0.123] [0.127] [0.207] [0.116] [0.116] [0.246]
b Observations 646 572 127 592 515 137
Children's age range 17‐39 23‐39 30‐39 17‐42 23‐42 30‐42
Father's age range 39‐60 40‐60 50‐60 42‐60 43‐60 50‐60
Mother
Log(mother's income) [IV=educ.] 0.644*** 0.451*** Sample too small. 0.355** 0.303**
[0.173] [0.131] [0.144] [0.134]
Observations 313 254 262 212
Children's age range 17‐43 23‐43 17‐43 23‐43











Log(father's income) [IV=educ.] 0.603 0.601 0.720 0.735 0.445
[0.086]*** [0.088]*** [0.103]*** [0.110]*** [0.178]**
Observations 2813 2721 2011 1638 650
Children's age range 17‐58 23‐58 30‐58 30‐42 17‐39
Father's age range 38‐74 40‐74 48‐74 48‐74 39‐60
Father‐daughter
Log(father's income) [IV=educ.] 0.730 0.690 0.830 0.841 0.501
[0.087]*** [0.087]*** [0.112]*** [0.119]*** [0.163]***
Observations 2662 2573 1896 1593 595
Children's age range 17‐54 23‐54 30‐54 30‐42 17‐41
Father's age range 40‐74 40‐74 47‐74 47‐74 42‐60
Panel B:
Mother‐son
Log(mother's income) [IV=educ.] 0.369 0.364 0.344 0.330 0.526
[0.067]*** [0.068]*** [0.082]*** [0.085]*** [0.134]***
Observations 1734 1648 1014 909 352
Children's age range 17‐53 23‐53 30‐53 30‐42 17‐39
Mother's age range 37‐69 41‐69 49‐69 49‐69 37‐55
Mother‐daughter
Log(mother's income) [IV=educ.] 0.388 0.370 0.468 0.465 0.356
[0.071]*** [0.072]*** [0.091]*** [0.093]*** [0.160]**
Observations 1697 1616 1015 944 307
Children's age range 17‐50 23‐50 30‐50 30‐42 17‐38
Mother's age range 40‐69 42‐69 48‐69 48‐69 40‐55
Panel C:
Parents‐son
Log(parental income) [IV=educ.] 0.554 0.557 0.574 0.586 0.598
[0.078]*** [0.079]*** [0.090]*** [0.097]*** [0.183]***
Observations 2813 2721 2011 1638 650
Parents‐daughter
Log(parental income) [IV=educ.] 0.775 0.718 0.858 0.864 0.491
[0.078]*** [0.078]*** [0.097]*** [0.102]*** [0.160]***






























































































































































































































































































































































Father‐son Father‐daughter Mother‐son Mother‐daughter
IV=occ. & ind. IV=educ. IV=occ. & ind. IV=educ. IV=occ. & ind. IV=educ. IV=occ. & ind. IV=educ.
 [Instrumen0.607 0.520 0.607 0.596 0.171 0.298 0.447 0.318
[0.100]*** [0.088]*** [0.100]*** [0.088]*** [0.086]** [0.072]*** [0.092]*** [0.075]***
ber 0.209 0.184 0.209 0.201 0.134 0.130 0.199 0.196
[0.030]*** [0.024]*** [0.030]*** [0.030]*** [0.033]*** [0.033]*** [0.037]*** [0.037]***
mber 0.109 0.042 0.109 0.106 0.108 0.080 0.094 0.092
[0.026]*** [0.024]* [0.026]*** [0.025]*** [0.035]*** [0.036]** [0.038]** [0.039]**
Observations
Robust standard err
2657 2811 2657 2657 1734 1734 1695 1695
ors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Parent income is the permanent income of the child's mother or father (see text for details). Each column is a separate regression. 
30Country Data year Elasticity Children's ageParents' age Methods Authors
Australia 2004 0.2‐0.3 25‐55 40 (assigned) IV Leigh (2007)
Brazil 1996 0.80‐0.83 30‐39 30‐50 (in 1976) TS2SLS Dunn(2007)
Britain 1991‐2003 0.32 31‐45 N.A. IV Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007)
Britain 1991 0.56‐0.58 33 (mean) 47.5 (mean) IV Dearden et al. (1997)
Canada 1986‐1994 0.22 30‐39 when child aged 15 IV Fortin and Lefebvre (1998)
Canada 1998 0.21 32‐35 45.5 (mean) OLS Corak (2001, 2006)
China (Urban) 2004 0.32 N.A. N.A. OLS Guo and Min (2008)
Ecuador 1994 1.13 24‐40 45‐60 TS2SLS Grawe (2001,04)
France 1993 0.41 30‐40 55‐70 TS2SLS Lefranc and Trannoy (2005)
Germany 1984 0.12 25 (mean) 50‐51 (mean) OLS Couch and Dunn (1997)
Italy 2000‐2004 0.44 30‐45 30‐50 (in 1977‐1979)TS2SLS Mocetti (2007)
Malaysia 1976/1989 0.54 >=23 24‐59 IV Grawe (2004)
Nepal 1995 0.32 24‐40 45‐60 TS2SLS Grawe (2001,04)
Pakistan 1991 0.24 25‐35 45‐60 TS2SLS Grawe (2001,04)
Peru 1985 0.67 24‐40 45‐60 TS2SLS Grawe (2001,04)
South Africa 1993‐1998 0.61 25.1(mean) 53.7(mean) OLS Hertz(2001)
Sweden 1991 0.28 30‐39 43.3 (mean) TS2SLS Bjorklund and Jantti (1997)
Sweden 1992 0.13 25‐51 52 OLS Osterberg (2001)
United States 1993 04 7 28 41 40 2 (mean) IV Grawe (2004)
Table 7: Summary of recent studies on intergenerational income elasticity for different countries
Father‐son
United States 1993 0.47 28‐41 40.2 (mean) IV Grawe (2004)
United States 1981/1984 0.39 14‐59 N.A. IV Altonji and Dunn (2000)
United States 1984 0.41 25‐33 44 (mean) OLS Solon (1992)
United States 1984 0.53 25‐33 44 (mean) IV Solon (1992)









Canada 1986‐1994 0.22 30‐39 when child aged 15 IV Fortin and Lefebvre (1998)









United States 1981/1984 0.4 14‐59 N.A. IV Altonji and Dunn (2000)
Mother‐son United States 1981/1984 0.29 14‐59 N.A. IV Altonji and Dunn (2000)
United States 1981/1984 0.27 14‐59 N.A. IV Altonji and Dunn (2000)
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Figure 4: Distribution of the number of years predicted income used to calculate 
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Figure 7: Intergenerational Education correlation (regression coefficients) by Children’s 



















Correlations of schooling by children's birth year
 
35Father‐son




Log(father's income) [IV=occ. & ind.] 0.476 0.471 0.564 0.477 0.466
[0.102]*** [0.103]*** [0.130]*** [0.136]*** [0.197]**
Observations 2813 2721 2011 1638 650
Father‐daughter
Log(father's income) [IV=occ. & ind.] 0.739 0.739 1.013 0.991 0.306
[0.099]*** [0.101]*** [0.135]*** [0.142]*** [0.174]*
Observations 2662 2573 1896 1593 595
Mother‐son
Log(mother's income) [IV=occ. & ind.] 0.264 0.260 0.337 0.326 0.519
[0.083]*** [0.085]*** [0.112]*** [0.117]*** [0.168]***
Observations 1734 1648 1014 909 352
Mother‐daughter
Log(mother's income) [IV=occ. & ind.] 0.518 0.520 0.711 0.726 0.356
[0.090]*** [0.091]*** [0.129]*** [0.133]*** [0.204]*




Log(parental income) [IV=occ. & ind.] 0.263 0.262 0.26 0.234 0.243
[0.045]*** [0.046]*** [0.052]*** [0.055]*** [0.114]**
Observations 2813 2721 2011 1638 650
Parents‐daughter
Log(parental income) [IV=occ. & ind.] 0.396 0.371 0.423 0.413 0.151
[0.049]*** [0.049]*** [0.060]*** [0.061]*** [0.103]





Appendix B: Unconditional correlation between children and father’s predicted incomes 
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